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We seek to offer some reconciliation for the conflicting theoretical arguments and empirical 
findings regarding the impact of women’s participation in boards on firms’ performance. We 
suggest that this impact differs in relation to market- and accounting-performance, and it is firm-
specific, and varies by firms’ ownership type and the composition of their boards. These 
arguments find theoretical underpinnings in agency and resource-dependency theories, combined 
with behavioral and discrimination theories that articulate women behavior in the workplace and 
market perception of gender equality. The empirical analysis is based on a dataset of 841 
publicly-listed firms in Malaysia. The results show positive impact of women’s participation on 
accounting-performance and negative impact on market-performance, suggesting that women 
directors create economic value, which is undervalued by the market. We interpret the findings 
with reference to the perception of women’s role in society and business in Malaysia, and the 
nature of corporate governance and ownership types prevalent among Malaysian firms. We 
suggest that the relationships might be context-specific, and hence the desired level of women’s 





participation varies across countries. We discuss the normative implications of the findings for 






WOMEN ON BOARDS OF MALAYSIAN FIRMS: 
IMPACT ON MARKET AND ACCOUNTING PERFORMANCE 
 Government authorities around the world are adopting policies designed to increase the 
participation of women on firms’ boards. Norway pioneered these acts when it introduced in 
2003 a mandatory legislation that requires publicly-traded firms to have 40% women on their 
boards (up from an average of 9% at the time the legislation was announced). Failure to meet the 
quota will put the firm into forced liquidation. Several European countries have followed 
Norway’s example, and the EU is considering the application of a similar quota. Similar attempts 
are at different stages in a few non-European countries (Ahern and Dittmar, 2011). 
These policies are based on the belief that women’s presence on boards positively affect 
management practices and creates economic value. The theoretical and empirical support for this 
belief, however, is mixed and inconclusive. There are suggestions that deviation from male-
dominated boards brings about informational and social diversity that improves performance 
(Dezsö and Ross, 2012). Women management style, notably their tendency to pay attention to 
audit, risk oversight and control, was also noted as an attribute that positively affects 
performance (Croson and Gneezy, 2009). Others maintain that because women usually do not 
belong to the ‘old boys club’, they correspond to the concept of independent directors more 
closely than their male counterparts, a feature emphasized in theory as a positive attribute of 
board structure (Jensen and Meckling, 1976; Daily, Dalton and Cannella, 2003). At the same 
time, there is also recognition of women’s limited experience in managerial positions, their lesser 
drive to advance to the top, and their poor performance in competitive environments (Niederle 
and Vesterlund, 2010). These attributes are likely to turn their presence on boards ineffective 
(Stephenson, 2004). There are also suggestions that the presence of women triggers resentment 
to diversity and diminishes the quality of boards’ working practices (Phillips, Liljenquist and 
Neale, 2009).  
 Consistent with the theoretical ambiguity, the empirical evidence is inconclusive, even in 
studies conducted in the same country. Some studies found that women’s presence on boards 
positively affect firms’ performance (Smith, Smith and Verner, 2006; Ararat, Aksu and Cetin, 
2010; Campbell and Vera, 2010), whereas others show no discernible impact (Rose, 2007; 
Hagendorff and Keasey, 2012). Yet other studies show that after controlling for endogeneity, 
women’s participation on boards lessens firms’ performance (Adams and Ferreira, 2009; Ahern 
and Dittmar, 2011).  
The limited understanding of the impact of women’s participation on performance is 
disturbing. Boards exercise strong impact on firms’ practices and management (Shleifer and 
Vishny, 1997), and their composition is a critical determinant of these outcomes (Adams, 
Hermalin and Weisbach, 2010). As more and more governments introduce gender-related 
legislations regarding boards’ composition, it is critical to extend our knowledge of the likely 
consequences of these policies. If women’s participation harms performance, such policies 
would have negative impact on firms and economies. The issue is of particular importance in the 
contemporary business environment, whereby boards increasingly seize their power and become 
more involved in the management of firms, and boards’ roles and responsibilities are being 
reassessed (Lorsch, 2012).  
We suggest that the theoretical ambiguity and mixed findings of extant research reflect the 
inherent complexity of the relationships between women’s presence on boards and firms’ 
performance. Drawing on agency (Jensen and Meckling, 1976; Fama and Jensen, 1983) and 





Vianen and Keizer, 1996) and discrimination theories (Becker, 1957; Arrow, 1972), we develop 
a three-pillar theoretical framework that seeks to identify the forces that shape these relationships 
and to outline the logic beyond their inherently mixed and nuanced nature.  
The first principle underlying our theory is that the impact of women’s participation varies 
across different performance dimensions. We focus on market- and accounting-performances, 
which capture different aspects of the relationships of interest. As a measure of market 
evaluation of firms’ future performance, market performance reflects societal perceptions 
regarding the role of women in business that shapes the anticipation of their performance. 
Accounting performance is informative of women’s actual performance as board members.  
The second pillar of our theory is that the relationships between women’s presence on 
boards and performance are firm-specific and vary with firms’ ownership and the composition of 
their boards. These attributes are likely to affect the extent of women’s participation, as well as 
the merits of their distinctive managerial style and the diversity they bring to boards. Lastly, our 
theory is underlain by the assumption that the relationships are inherently context-specific. The 
impact of context manifests itself in several ways in our theory. For one, it is reflected in the 
market-performance measure that reveals the prevailing attitudes towards gender equality in a 
given context. It also affects ownership type and board composition, attributes that are known to 
vary across different societies (La Porta, Lopes-de-Silanes and Shleifer, 1999; Aguilera and 
Jackson, 2003; Estévez-Abe, 2006; Kogut, 2012).  
 The hypotheses are tested based on a dataset of 841 companies that represent all Malaysia 
publicly-listed companies for which data were available in 2008. Malaysia provides an 
interesting context for the study. The view of gender equality in Malaysia is distinctively shaped 
by the two dominant religions among the country’s business people – Islam and Confucianism. 
Malaysia is notable also in its commitment to gender equality, including the participation of 
women on boards (MWFCD, 2008), and in the distinctive nature of its corporate governance 
(Abdullah, Yosuf and Nor, 2010; Salim, 2011). We find that the performance consequences of 
women’s presence on boards manifest in conflicting directions, positively affecting accounting 
performance and negatively affecting market performance. Ownership types partly moderates 
these relationships, and boards’ ethnic diversity showing no discerned effect.  
 The study makes important contributions to theory and practice. The theoretical 
framework we develop, which is underpinned by recognition of the complexity of the 
relationships and their inherently variant nature, serves to reconcile, in part, the inconclusive 
state of theory regarding the impact of women’s presence on boards on firms’ performance. Its 
notable merit lies in conceptualizing the relationships as inherently firm- and context-specific 
and in beginning to unravel the variety of factors that explain the variations in the impact of 
women directors on performance. 
Further, to the best of our knowledge, our study is the first to examine these relationships in 
an emerging market context. Ararat, Aksu and Cetin (2010) in Turkey and Darmadi (2011) in 
Indonesia are the only studies we are aware of that tested the impact of board diversity on 
performance in this context, but in both studies gender diversity is one of several diversity 
dimensions, and the theoretical and empirical contributions lie in studying diversity in general. 
The focus on gender diversity in an emerging economy is an important contribution because it 
provides insights regarding the ways by which cultural, economic, and social attributes shape the 
impact of women’s presence on boards on performance (Estévez-Abe, 2006).  
 Our study carries important lessons also for practice. The positive impact of women 





women’s participation on boards. At the same time, the negative market reaction to women on 
boards that we find, although their presence creates economic value for firms, suggests that the 
market responds in an irrational way to women’s presence, and requires appropriate response by 
governments. The concern is that this state of affairs is likely to cause resource misallocation and 
lead to under-utilization of women. For firms, our findings entail that in addition to financial 
benefits associated with women’s nominations such acts may constrain the ability to raise equity 
capital, and could hinder the positive impact of women’s presence on boards. The study is of 
particular interest for firms in countries in which governments issue recommendations related to 
women’s presence on boards but do not enforce them, as a number of countries, including 
Malaysia, do. This approach leaves room for firms to decide about the level of women’s 
participation on their boards, turning it into an important strategic decision.  
 The structure of our paper is as follows. The following section discusses the theoretical 
framework and hypotheses. Next, we discuss the methods employed in this research. Following 
that, we present and discuss our results. Finally we conclude the paper. 
THEORY AND HYPOTHESES 
 Women’s participation as board members amends boards’ composition by diversifying it 
on the gender dimension. Their presence modifies the logic of the major theories that articulate 
boards’ functions and their performance consequences - agency theory (Jensen and Meckling, 
1976) and resource-dependency theory (Pfeffer and Salancik, 1978) - in two major ways. One is 
that women behave differently as board members, so their presence changes board behavior; the 
other is related to societal perceptions that affect the attitudes of firms’ stakeholders towards 
women directors, and the consequences of their presence for boards’ functioning and firms’ 
performance. These processes are articulated respectively by behavioral theories (Eagly and 
Johnson, 1990; van Vianen and Keizer, 1996) and labor market discrimination theories (Becker, 
1957; Arrow, 1972).  
 Drawing on these theories we suggest several reasons for anticipating a positive impact of 
women’s presence on accounting performance. For one, it increases the diversity of the board on 
the gender dimension. According to agency theory, diversity strongly affects boards’ 
functioning, and gender is an important diversity dimension (Farrell and Hersch 2005; Herring, 
2009; Carter, D’Souza, Simkins and Simpson, 2010). Women directors bring different attitudes, 
values, and expertise to the decision-making processes, which lead to more careful evaluation of 
alternatives (Dezsö and Ross, 2012). Their presence is also likely to increase boards’ 
independence of management, an attribute that is maintained to improve monitoring (Fama and 
Jensen, 1983; Daily, Dalton and Cannella, 2003). Women directors may also extend firms’ 
external links to resources controlled by women, assist firms to interact with their customers, the 
majority of whom tend to be women, and to attract and retain valuable female employees 
(Pfeffer and Salancik, 1978; Stephenson, 2004).  
    The second reason for anticipating positive impact of women on boards on performance 
is that drawing on the feminine half of the population that is often excluded from the candidate 
pool for board nomination is likely to improve the quality of board members. Becker’s (1957) 
discrimination theory suggests that the exclusion of segments of the population from the pool of 
potential candidates on discriminatory grounds is costly for firms, particularly when the excluded 
groups are large, as is the case in relation to women. In 2011, women occupy about 10% of 
board positions of a sample of 4,200 privately-held firms from 45 countries (Catalyst, 2011). 
This representation is not on par with women’s education achievements and performance in the 





group would affords firms access to high quality human capital and is likely to result in 
nominations of more qualified board members (Appold, Siengthai and Kasarda, 1998; Siegel, 
Pyun and Cheon, 2011). Formally: 
Hypothesis 1: Women’s participation on boards enhances accounting performance. 
 There are several grounds for anticipating that the market reaction for women directors is 
unfavorable, such that women’s presence on boards affects market performance negatively. For 
one, unlike the impact of women directors on accounting-performance, which is indicative of 
women’s actual performance, the impact on market-performance reflects societal perceptions of 
women’s role in business and in top managerial positions. The presence of women on boards is 
perceived in most societies as violating norms regarding gender behavior, giving rise to negative 
attitudes towards boards populated with women directors. Attitudes towards gender differences 
are among the most fundamental and enduring aspects that shape societal values and culture 
(Hofstede, 1998). These are strongly pronounced in relation to board positions that are associated 
with power, authority and control, attributes that are decidedly masculine (Haveman and 
Beresford, 2012).  
 Labor market discrimination theories provide additional support for anticipating similar 
outcome (Becker, 1957; Arrow, 1972). These theories suggest that the market views of gender 
differences are often entirely unrelated to economic outcomes, resulting in market responses that 
reflect value judgment rather than actual differences (Darity and Mason, 1998). The response of 
the market to women’s participation on boards is often based on societal stereotypes and 
perceptions rather than on evaluation of women’s qualifications and their performance. Indeed, 
Farrell and Hersch (2005) found insignificant abnormal returns surrounding the appointment of 
women on boards, although the impact of women directors on accounting performance was 
positive and significant. Similar findings were reported by Lee and James (2007) in relation to 
the appointment of women CEOs.  
 Further, the presence of women on boards might be perceived as suggesting that the firm is 
less likely to operate in a manner that best protects shareholders (Jensen and Meckling, 1976). 
Women tend to be more risk-averse and often put the interests of stakeholders and society in 
large before those of shareholders (Eagly and Johnson, 1990; Beutel and Marini, 1995; Andreoni 
and Vesterlund, 2001).   
 A resource dependency perspective suggests that women’s presence is likely to be 
perceived as hurting boards’ ability to connect with the typically male-dominated external 
resources (Bowles, Babcock and McGinn, 2005). It may also be regarded as likely to lower the 
firm’s legitimacy and reputation, thus weakening its ability to link to valuable resources and 
increasing the challenge of interaction with them.  
 Moreover, the nomination of women as board members represents a unique move, because 
in most countries few firms nominate women directors. Such moves are perceived by 
shareholders as risky, because there are few, if any, precedencies that can be used as indications 
of likely outcome. Uniqueness is not viewed favorably by shareholders, and is systematically 
discounted for by capital markets (Lubomir, Moreton and Zenger, 2012). The market bias against 
women on boards is likely to further exacerbate by the dearth of women investors. Men are more 
likely to hold stereotypes against women in leadership positions. Bigelow and Parks (2006) 
found that male investors are ready to invest three times more money in male-led firms than in 
female-led firms. For female investors, however, gender is not an important determinant of 
investment decision. Formally: 






 We further anticipate that the impact of women directors on performance is firm-specific 
and varies across firms with different ownership types and board compositions. These 
characteristics are likely to affect the likelihood of women nomination to boards and to influence 
the outcomes of their presence on boards by affecting the merits of gender diversity and the 
value of women’s distinctive managerial style.  
 Compared with privately-owned firms, family and government ownerships are likely to 
weaken the impact of women’s presence on boards on accounting-performance. Such firms often 
select board members from a narrow pool of candidates that includes family members (Anderson 
and Reeb, 2003) and people with political ties (Fana, Wonga, and Zhangb, 2007). These 
tendencies are likely to be accentuated in relation to women. Nominating women as board 
members is a high-risk move because it represents deviation from societal norms (Lubomir, et 
al., 2012). The dearth of women on boards, which entails that there are few precedencies from 
which to learn and anticipate behavior and outcomes, further magnifies the risk. Nominating 
women that are insiders to the group reduces the risk inherent in such nominations. Family- and 
government-owned firms are typically more risk-averse, and hence more likely to nominate 
women that are family members or government officials.  
 This nomination practice is likely to harm performance because boards consisting of large 
number of directors with ties with the top management are more dependent on the top 
management and the firms and hence are less effective in monitoring (Jensen and Meckling, 
1976; Anderson and Reeb, 2003). This nomination practice also restricts the pool of potential 
candidates, which in the case of women is particularly small. With fewer candidates to select 
from, there is greater likelihood of nominating lesser qualified women (Siegel et al., 2011). 
 In addition, gender diversity and the plurality of views that it brings to board discussions 
are likely to be of lesser value in settings that are dominated by the need to reach consensus in 
order to secure long-term continuity. In family-owned firms, diversity might be perceived as a 
threat for family relationships and the unity needed to secure the family’s survival (Bertrand and 
Schoar, 2006). Plurality of views is not desired on government boards either, as it may threaten 
the stability of the government and its political power (Shleifer and Vishny, 1994). Deviation 
from the status-quo could have harmful consequences for government-owned firms that need to 
reach a consensus between conflicting pressures of political groups. In these settings, diversity 
may jeopardize board discussions and diminish their effectiveness (Phillips, et al., 2009; Carter, 
et al., 2010), hindering firms’ performance. Formally:  
Hypothesis 3a: Compared with private ownership, family and government ownerships 
negatively moderate the relationships between women’s participation on boards and 
accounting performance. 
 Ownership type is a significant predictor of firm value, and an important attribute that 
affects shareholders’ investment decisions. Shareholders exhibit preference for ownership that is 
aligned with their goals, and is likely to serve their needs most effectively (Jensen and Meckling, 
1976). Privately-owned firms, driven by profit maximization, are usually perceived to meet 
shareholders’ interests most closely. The goals of family- and government-owned firms, in 
contrast, often diverge from the value maximization goals that are the major concern of 
shareholders (Shleifer and Vishny, 1994; Mitchell, Agle, Chrisman and Spence, 2011).  
 These preferences are likely to be accentuated in the presence of women directors. 
Women’s distinctive managerial style, notably their attention to long-term survival and social 





the goals of family and government owners (Bennedsen, Perez-Gonzales and Wokenzon, 2010). 
The presence of women on boards may thus be perceived by shareholders as likely to heighten 
the attention given to these issues and as indicating that firms are more likely to use their 
resources for such purposes at the expense of value maximization.  
 The greater tendency to hire women from within the firms’ circles noted above could also 
be perceived by shareholders as a threat for their interest. Boards managed by large numbers of 
group members (i.e., family members, government officials) have greater independence to act 
unilaterally and idiosyncratically and to pursue firm-specific agendas that deviate from 
shareholders’ interests (Chrisman and Patel, 2012). Le Breton-Miller, Miller, and Lester (2011) 
show that large numbers of family members on boards increase the likelihood of firms’ behavior 
that favors the interest of the family, which trumps those related purely to business matters.   
Hypothesis 3b: Compared with private ownership, family and government ownerships 
negatively moderate the relationships between women’s participation on boards and 
market performance. 
 Board composition, notably its diversity, is another attribute likely to moderate the 
relationships between women’s participation on boards and performance. The diversity of the 
board determines the plurality of views and points of reference brought to board discussions 
(Adams et al., 2010; Carter et al., 2010). One diversity dimension particularly influential in 
emerging markets is ethnic diversity, because the ethnic composition of these countries is 
typically highly diverse (Taylor and Hudson, 1983; Fearon, 2003). Ethnicity was also shown to 
have strong impact on the people loyalty and view of the world (Glennerster, Miguel and 
Rothenberg, 2010) and is also likely to affect the way people view women’s role in business and 
on boards. Ethnic diversity is thus likely to affect boards’ attitudes towards women and their 
nomination processes, as well as the nature of women’s board participation, thus affecting the 
performance consequences of their board participation. 
 Boards’ ethnic diversity is likely to free board decisions and choices from the dominant 
views and preferences of a major ethnic group, resulting in nomination processes that are based 
on the qualifications of the candidates rather than on their ethnic origin (Erhardt, Werbel and 
Shrader, 2003). Ethnicity was shown to be a most influential factor on the preference of people 
to link with those that resemble themselves, and to override the impact of other demographic 
characteristics (Gompers, Mukharlyamov and Xuan, 2012). In addition, by avoiding the 
predominance of a major ethnic group, the nominations of ethnically diverse boards are likely to 
result in women body that is more closely aligned with the ethnic breakdown of firms’ 
stakeholders.   
 Further, the plurality of views and opinions that gender diversity brings to the board is 
likely to be of greater value in the context of ethnically diverse boards. Such boards tend to have 
what Farell and Hersch named ‘internal taste for diversity’ (2005, p. 86), making them more 
open to new ideas and points of view, and less trapped in a dominate group-think view that 
challenges differences and variety (Jolls and Sunstein, 2006). Ethnically-diverse boards are thus 
more likely to create an environment in which the plurality of views that women bring to boards 
discussions are welcomed and viewed positively, providing support for women to make their 
presence on board noticeable (Thompson and Sekaquaptewa, 2002).  
 We suggest that these features of ethnically-diverse boards are likely to foster the positive 
impact of women on accounting performance and diminish the negative impact of their presence 
on market performance. The nomination of more professionally qualified women that greater 





better monitoring and advisory services and link the firm with higher-value external resources. 
Further, as noted above, diverse boards are more likely to nominate women body that is 
ethnically diverse. This is likely to be viewed favorably by the market, because shareholders tend 
to believe that diverse boards are more attentive to diverse needs and better protect their interests 
(Farell and Hersch, 2005). Formally: 
Hypothesis 4a: Board ethnic diversity positively moderates the relationships between 
women’s participation on boards and accounting performance. 
Hypothesis 4b: Board ethnic diversity positively moderates the relationships between 
women’s participation on boards and market performance. 
 Figure 1 presents our theorization of the relationships between women’s presence on 
boards and performance and the anticipated impact of the moderating effects. 
Figure 1 about here 
METHOD 
The Research Context: Women on boards of Malaysian firms 
 Malaysia provides a most interesting context for our study. It is notable in its efforts to 
promote women in business, including on boards of directors. Only a few countries outside the 
EU have considered the introduction of policies directed to promote the presence of women on 
boards, and to the best of our knowledge, as of 2012, Poland is the only non-developed country 
where the country’s code of good governance recommends gender equality (Ahern and Dittmar, 
2011; Catalyst, 2011). In Malaysia, however, gender equality in the work place, including on 
boards, has attracted considerable public interest. Improving women role in society is seen by the 
Malaysian government as an essential part of the intention to become a developed country by 
2020 (MWFCD, 2008; Ng, 2010). The Government has taken several measures to increase the 
participation of women, including the establishment of a Government Ministry dedicated to the 
promotion of women and a Cabinet Committee on Gender Equality chaired by the Prime 
Minister1.  
 As part of these initiatives, in 2004 the Government issued strong recommendation to 
public and corporate sectors to appoint 30% women at the decision-making levels. Unlike the 
public sector, the corporate sector saw a slow progress in achieving the target. Subsequently, in 
2011, the government announced the same policy to the corporate sector, giving 2016 as the 
deadline for firms to achieve the quota. The recommendations were incorporated in the revised 
Code of Corporate Governance that takes effect in 2012. The Code states that boards should 
ensure that women candidates are sought as part of the recruitment exercise, and requires the 
disclosure of information regarding women’s presence on boards in firms’ annual reports. The 
policy, which lacks a legal power to enforce it, has so far achieved mixed results, with 
substantial variations across firms. The performance consequences of this move are of 
considerable importance, making our study relevant and timely, particularly as the policy leaves 
room for choice for firms. 
The Model and the Data 
 The testing of the hypotheses is based on the following model:    
                                                 
1 Several high profile appointments of women signal the government commitment to the improvement of women 
opportunities. The current Central Bank Governor, the Chairman of the Securities Commission and the Vice 
Chancellor of one of Malaysia’s prestigious universities are women. In 2001, Malaysia appointed its first female 
Attorney General. The percentage of women elected as parliament members has increased from 4.5% in 1980 to 





𝑃𝑖 = 𝑎 + 𝛽𝑖WOMEN + 𝛽𝑖 𝑂𝑊𝑁𝐸𝑅𝑆𝐻𝐼𝑃 + 𝛽𝑖 𝐵𝑂𝐴𝑅𝐷 +  𝛽𝑖 (𝑊𝑂𝑀𝐸𝑁 ∗ 𝑂𝑊𝑁𝐸𝑅𝑆𝐻𝐼𝑃) +
𝛽𝑖 (𝑊𝑂𝑀𝐸𝑁 ∗ 𝐵𝑂𝐴𝑅𝐷) + 𝛽𝑖 𝑋 + 𝜀𝑖 
where 𝑃𝑖  stands for performance of firm i, WOMEN represents women’s participation on boards, 
OWNERSHIP and BOARD are the moderating effects. X is a vector of control variables that 
according to theory are likely to influence performance, including board- and firm-
characteristics. 𝜀𝑖 stands for the standard error, attributed to misspecifications and idiosyncratic 
attributes of individual firms.  
In agreement with our theory, performance is measured by Tobin’s q and ROA, 
corresponding respectively to market- and accounting-performances. These measures have been 
used extensively in previous research on the performance impact of board composition, 
including gender diversity.  
We employ three measures to operationalize WOMEN: a dummy variable that 
distinguishes firms that have one or more women on their boards from those that have none, the 
absolute number of women directors, and the share of women among all board members. 
Research suggests that for women’s presence on boards to affect performance, there is a need for 
a minimum ‘critical mass’ (Konrad, Kramer and Erkut, 2008), which make women comfortable 
to voice their views, so their presence leaves its mark on board’s discussions. Konrad et al. 
(2008) suggest three women as the number beyond which gender ceases to be a barrier to 
acceptance and communication. Our three operations represent different measures of the 
magnitude of women’s presence on boards. The measures of WOMEN are cumulative and 
reflect women’s presence on boards at the time of data collection that is a result of aggregate 
nominations that took place over time. This approach has the advantage that it provides a long-
term perspective on the impact of women rather than a snapshot around the time of nomination.  
OWNERSHIP is measured by dummy variables that distinguish the three types of 
ownership common among Malay publically-listed firms: family, government and private 
ownership. We introduce two dummies to account for family- and government-owned firms, and 
hold private ownership constant. As the demarcation line for family ownership we employ the 
commonly used 20% (La Porta et al., 1999). Government owned-companies, known in Malaysia 
as Government Linked Companies (GLC), are firms in which the Malaysia Governments and 
State-level agencies have a controlling stake (Putrajaya Committee on GLC High Performance, 
2006)2.  
Board ethnic diversity (BOARD) is operationalized by the Simpson’s diversity index, a 
commonly used measure in sociology research (Gibbs and William, 1962): 
 
where p represents the proportion of individuals in category i and N is the number of categories. 
A diversity score equals 0 means that all directors are of the same ethnic group.  
The intention was to study all the 855 firms listed in Bursa Malaysia in 20083. Fourteen 
newly-listed firms were excluded because their financial data were not publicly available at the 
                                                 
2 Controlling stake refers to ownership of at least 20% of the company’s capital, as well as the Government’s ability 
to appoint board members and senior management, and make major decisions such as corporate strategy, 
restructuring, financing, acquisitions and divestments, either directly or through Government-Linked Investment 
Companies (GLICs). GLICs are Federal Government linked investment companies that allocate some or all of their 
funds to GLC investments.  






time of data collection. We were left with 841 companies, on which we collected data from 
secondary sources.  
Endogeneity concerns are inherent in research on the impact of women’s participation on 
boards on performance (Adams and Ferreira, 2009; Ahern and Dittmar, 2011; Duez and Ross, 
2012). There are reasons to assume that better performing firms are more likely to appoint 
women as board members, such that the two are determined jointly, violating the causal 
relationships assumed in our model4. While we recognize this issue, we believe that our study 
design and data reduce endogeneity concerns. As noted above, our measure of the presence of 
women on boards captures cumulative nominations that took place over time (see Appendix B 
for the number of years on boards of women directors), whereas the performance indicators are 
at one point in time. This introduces a time lag between the appointment of women and firm 
performance, and reduces the concern that the performance outcomes of previous nominations 
affect subsequent nominations, such that the results are driven by reverse causality.  
We believe that there are also theoretical reasons for assuming that in the context we 
study women’s nominations are exogenous to performance. For one, firms in Asia seldom 
publicize their gender recruitment policies or actions to avoid alienating their stakeholders 
(Siegel et al., 2011). This weakens and may eliminate endogeneity concern on the ground that 
better performing firms hire more women as a way of publicizing advanced governance practices 
and satisfying stakeholders, or because they have greater need for legitimacy (Certo, 2003). In 
addition, the tendency to nominate women that are family members or associated with 
government officials noted earlier is dominant in Malaysia. Almost half the women directors of 
Malaysian firms in 2008 have family relationships with board members (Appendix B). These 
relationship-based nominations are not related to performance, reducing concerns that better 
performing firms are subject to greater pressure to diversify their boards, or have the resources to 
support such moves even when they are not in agreement with economic goals.  
Table 1 presents a summary of the variables included in the model, their operation 
measures and sources, and descriptive statistics. Table 2 brings the Pearson coefficients of these 
variables. Most of the coefficients are below the suggested cut-off of 0.5, reducing concerns 
regarding correlation among the explanatory variables.  
Tables 1 and 2 about here 
RESULTS AND DISCUSSION 
The testing of the hypotheses is based on estimates of the model constructed above using 
OLS multiple regression with hierarchical modeling procedure (Table 3). We present only the 
results with WOMEN as a dummy variable. The other measures of WOMEN – by numbers and 
percentages – were not significant in any of the analyses. We will return to this issue in the 
robustness tests ahead.  
Table 3 about here 
 Women’s presence has positive and significant effect on ROA, supporting the anticipated 
positive impact of women’s presence on boards on accounting performance (H1)5. Malaysian 
firms that have at least one woman on their board have higher ROA than those that have none 
and the differences are statistically significant. The impact on market performance (Tobin’s q) is 
negative, as predicted in H2, but turns insignificant with the introduction of the moderating 
                                                 
4 The empirical evidence in support of this suggestion, however, is mixed and inconclusive, showing both over- and 
under-performing firms likely to have gender-diverse boards (see Terjesen, Sealy and Singh (2009) for review). 
5 This finding should be evaluated with the caveat that the ROA measure could be biased on the ground of 





effects, which probably capture this effect. These results suggest that women directors bring 
financial benefits, but the market discounts the value of their presence.  
Several characteristics of Malaysia seem to explain the positive results found for accounting 
performance (H1). For one, board diversity is likely to be particularly valuable, given the 
diversity of Malaysia – ethnically, religiously, linguistically, and as a result culturally. The 
population of Malaysia consists of three main ethnic groups - Malays, Chinese, and Indians – 
which are characterized by distinct religious beliefs, customs, rituals, and language (Shafii, 
Abiddin and Ahmad, 2009). Malaysia is ranked very high on Taylor and Hudson (1983) list of 
levels of ethno-linguistic diversity. Diverse boards can be more attentive to this diverse and 
better manage the relationships with diverse stakeholders. A study of the impact of board 
diversity on the performance of Malaysia top 100 non-financial firms found that diversity, 
measured by the share of Malay directors, is positively and significantly correlated with ROA 
(Marimuthu, 2008). 
Further, the extended networking opportunities that women directors bring and the 
relationships they can establish with  external sources to whom firms may have limited access 
otherwise (Stephenson, 2004) is particularly valuable in Malaysia. Due to uncertainty and 
institutional voids, relationships are major means of securing access to resources and information 
and facilitating economic exchange (Acquaah, 2012). Extending the scope of a firm’s 
relationships due to greater gender diversification is of particular value in such a context. 
Moreover, the pool of underutilized potential women candidates for board nomination is 
large in Malaysia, presumably due to deeply rooted negative attitudes towards women in leading 
managerial positions. Firms that draw on this pool are likely to increase the quality of their 
boards and reap performance benefits (Becker, 1957; Siegel et al., 2011). As of 2008, women 
accounted for 68% of students in government-funded universities and for 36% of the workforce. 
Almost 30% of working women are professionals, legislators, senior officials, managers, 
technicians and associate professionals (MWFCD, 2008), the highest level in Asia, according to 
the 2011 Global Gender Gap Report. Malaysia ranks 49 in the Economist Intelligence Unit 
Women’s Economic Opportunity 2010 Index and 75 in the world Global Gender Gap Report 
2011, on par with many developed countries. Women’s board participation, however, is very low 
(Table 4), and far below the world average (Catalyst, 2011). As the data in Table 4 show, in 
2008, more than half of Malaysia publicly-traded firms did not have any women on their boards, 
and a third had only one woman.  
Table 4 about here 
 The negative impact of women on boards on market-performance (H2) can also be 
attributed to several distinctive characteristics of Malaysia. For one, it could be the outcome of 
the prevailing views towards gender equality, which reflects beliefs and norms rooted in Islam 
and Confucianism, the religions held by the two dominant ethnic groups in Malaysia - Chinese 
and Malays. A perception of gender inequality has deep roots in both traditions, giving rise to a 
reluctance to nominate women to positions of power (Fish, 2011). The Qur’an states that ‘Men 
are the protectors and maintainers of women, because Allah has given the one more (strength) 
than the other, and because they support them from their means.’ (An-Nisa, verse 33). In a 
similar fashion, Confucius expressed the view in the Analects that there is plenty of male talent 
in society and hence no need to appoint women for positions of power and seniority (Li, 2000). 
This suggestion is in agreement with the views of Asian CEOs surveyed by McKinsey who said 
that greater gender diversity is not a strategic priority for their companies, and they do not intend 





The governance structure typical of Malaysia companies, which provides weak protection 
for minority shareholders, is another characteristic that is likely to accentuate the negative 
response of the market for the presence of women on boards. Feeling less protected, shareholders 
could be particularly averse to women nomination, a risky move that could be perceived to 
increase the risk inherent in their investment. Malaysia companies are characterized by 
concentrated ownership, most typically by one or several shareholders that hold most of the 
voting rights (Claessens and Fan, 2002; Abdullah et al., 2010; Salim, 2011). The large owners 
often also manage the firms, directly or indirectly. This introduces considerable power 
differential between the controlling shareholders and minority shareholders. Those with 
controlling interests typically pursue their own benefits to a greater extent than when ownership 
is more widely diffused (Jensen and Meckling, 1976). Moreover, minority protection in Malaysia 
is low, leaving minority investors highly vulnerable to violations of their interests (La Porta et 
al., 1999). As a result, investors are likely to be highly risk-averse, and resist women 
nominations that are perceived as increasing risk. 
The negative results we find for market performance should be evaluated in light of 
research that shows that women’s presence on boards is notable in its positive impact on market 
performance in settings with weak shareholders rights (Adams and Ferreira, 2009), as is the case 
in Malaysia (Salim, 2011). Women’s managerial style as board members, notably their greater 
attention to monitoring, is perceived by shareholders to be particularly valuable in such settings. 
One interpretation of our findings could be that the impact of the characteristics of Malaysia 
cited to explain the results is very decisive and outweighs the perceptions of the benefits that 
women’s presence brings.   
The impact of the moderating effect is mixed, and generally weak. Ownership type is 
insignificant in the analyses with ROA as the dependent variable, providing no support for H3a. 
This challenges the suggestion that because women nomination to boards by family and 
government-owned companies are more likely to be based on affiliation and relationships, it 
results in less qualified women directors. It might also be that in a relationship-based society like 
Malaysia (Acquaah, 2012), firms of all ownership types base their board nominations on 
relationships, thus exhibiting similar shortcomings. The insider-dominated boards typical of 
Asian firms, including Malaysia, are in agreement with this suggestion (Claessens and Fan, 
2002). 
The insignificance of family-ownership in this analysis could also be attributed to the 
tendency of family-owned firms to pursue idiosyncratic goals to a greater extent than non-family 
firms do (Chrisman and Patel, 2012). This tendency introduces pronounced heterogeneity among 
family-owned firms, which resists generalizations and undermines the identification of dominant 
tendencies. It may also divert these firms’ behavior from theoretical expectations that are based 
on certain anticipated behavior.  
Government ownership significantly moderates the relationships with market 
performance, whereas family ownership is insignificant in this analysis, providing partial support 
for H3b. In agreement with the hypothesized relationships, the impact of government ownership 
is negative, suggesting that the market discounts the value of women on boards to a greater 
degree in government-owned firms. These findings could be interpreted in light of the 
differences among Malaysian firms in promoting women on their boards (Table 4). As our data 
show, in 2008, the prevalence of women on boards is most pronounced in government-owned 
companies (Table 4). These companies have been most responsive to the recommendations 





contrast, in 2008, less than 8% of the board seats of Malaysia privately-owned firms were 
occupied by women (Abdullah and Ismail, 2010). Only 23 firms met the government target of 
30% women on their boards. Our findings might reflect shareholders’ negative view of the 
greater participation of women on boards of government-owned companies.  
The findings could also be understood as reflecting shareholders’ perception that the risk 
associated with the presence of women is particularly high in government-owned companies. 
The concentration of ownership in these companies is higher than in Malaysia privately-owned 
companies, accentuating the weakness of minority shareholders. The weak protection of minority 
investors in Malaysia is also likely to be particularly worrying in relation to government-owned 
companies, given the strong power of the government in Malaysia and its influence on the 
business sector (Gomez and Jomo, 1999). The predominance of the Malays in government 
positions, combined with their management of Malaysia government-owned firms, further 
strengthens the power of the government. In addition, government-owned companies in Malaysia 
enjoy favorable access to financing and that reduces their dependency to the equity market and 
diminishes their need to satisfy shareholders. 
Another possible explanation for the negative impact of government ownership might lie 
in differences in the industrial structure of government and privately-owned firms. Malaysia 
government-owned firms are particularly active in infrastructure, heavy industries and natural 
resources, whereas the activities of privately-owned firms are more evenly distributed across 
industries (Dahlan, 2009). Studies show that the performance consequences of women on boards 
vary across industries, and are more substantial in industries where women play major role as 
consumers and employees (e.g., Ryan and Haslam, 2007; Adams and Ferreira, 2009). The 
negative impact of government ownership on the relationships between women on boards and 
performance could be a reflection of shareholders’ view that in the industries in which Malaysia 
government-owned companies are active, women’s board participation is of lesser value.  
The ethnic diversity of the board is not significant in any of the analyses, providing no 
support for H4a and H4b. Several characteristics of corporate governance in Malaysia might 
explain this finding. For one, the ethnic diversity of the boards of Malaysia companies is 
probably lower than in many other countries, undermining the validity of theories and empirical 
findings developed in these other settings. One reason for this pattern has to do with the 
predominance of Malaysian Chinese in business and on boards of Malay companies. In 2008, 
Malaysian Chinese directors accounted for 58% of the directors of Malaysian firms (Abdullah 
and Ismail, 2010). This dominance is mirrored also among women directors (Appendix B). The 
strong homophily tendencies common in East Asia are also likely to increase boards’ 
homogeneity. Gompers, Mukharlyamov and Xuan (2012) found that the preference of people for 
working with others that resemble themselves is particularly strong in East Asia. In their study, 
the likelihood of a partnership being formed between two people of East Asian decent is 74.5%, 
compared with 52% and 19% for Indian and Jewish partners.  
It might also be that there are conflicting forces at work that cancel each other. The 
positive impact of ethnic diversity we hypothesized is based on the benefits that diversity brings 
to boards’ working processes (Daily, Dalton and Cannella, 2003), but beyond certain levels, 
diversity could have negative effects as it paralyzes decision making and inhibits progress 
(Adams and Ferreira, 2009). The greater the number of diversity dimensions, the larger likely to 
be the tendency for a negative outcome of diversity (Herring, 2009). Gender diversity in the 
presence of ethnic diversity could magnify the negative consequences of diversity to an extent 






We conducted several tests to examine the robustness of our conclusions to different 
measures and specifications (Table 5). To begin, we employ 2009 performance measures, to 
examine the possibility that the atypical nature of the period in which data were collected, a 
result of the financial crisis, affect our findings (models 1 and 7)6.  As the data reported in Table 
5 show, the 2009 results are qualitatively similar to the 2008 results, with the exception that the 
impact of women’s presence on market performance (Tobin’s q) is insignificant, providing no 
support for H2. These results suggest that shareholders are indifferent to women’s presence on 
boards during difficult economic times, in agreement with research that shows that the market 
views differently the presence of women on boards during different time periods (Ryan and 
Haslam, 2007). 
Table 5 about here 
 We also estimated the models on a sub-sample of firms that have at least one woman on 
their boards (models 2, 3, 8 and 9). The large numbers of firms with no women on their boards in 
our sample could hide substantial variations in the relationships of interest because it reduces 
variations across firms. The non-significance of the measures of women by number and 
percentage in analyses of the whole sample could be a result of low variation. None of the 
hypotheses is confirmed on the reduced sample, suggesting that in Malaysia, the actual presence 
of women on boards, rather than the magnitude of their presence, is what makes the difference. 
Perhaps the mere act of nominating women signifies openness to gender diversity that affects 
performance.  
  Further, we used the share of Malaysian Chinese board members as an alternative 
measure of boards’ ethnic diversity (models 4 and 10). As noted above, this ethnic group is 
strongly represented on the boards of Malaysia companies. The results are similar to those with 
the ethnic diversity measure (Table 3), with the impact of women stronger in the Tobin’s q 
model. Board ethnic diversity by itself, however, is insignificant in any of the analyses also with 
this alternative measure, providing additional support for our conclusion that the ethnic diversity 
of the board does not affect the relationships between women’s board participation and 
performance in Malaysia. 
 Lastly, we estimated the moderating effects separately (models 5, 6, 11 and 12). Different 
ownership types are associated with different governance structure, including the ethnic 
composition of the board, such that the two could mask each other’s impact. As the results show, 
when estimated on their own, the moderating effects are not significant. This entails that the 
moderating impact of government ownership found in the estimate of the full model (Table 3) 
manifests only in the presence of board ethnic diversity. This is probably related to the 
distinctive structure of Malaysia business, where government-owned firms are governed by the 
indigenous Malaysian Malays and family-owned firms are controlled and managed by Malaysian 
Chinese. These differences are reflected also in the composition of the boards of these companies 
(Salim, 2011).    
CONCLUSION AND IMPLICATIONS 
                                                 
6 We selected the 2008 performance measures for the main analyses because the crisis affected Malaysia to a greater 
degree in 2009. Malaysia experienced an average GDP growth of 5.9% in the first nine months of 2008, before 
falling to 0.1% in the last quarter of this year. The major contraction, however, happened in 2009, when GDP shrunk 
by -6.2% and -3.9% in the first and second quarters respectively, and had only recovered towards the end of this 
year (Bank Negara Malaysia). There was also a substantial outflow of capital which affected the equity market, 
where foreign participants accounted for almost 40% of trading volume on the eve of the crisis, but this too was 





 In this study we sought to deepen the understanding of the impact of women’s presence on 
boards on performance. We find that the presence of women on boards of Malaysian firms 
creates economic value, but it is discounted by the market. These findings should be evaluated in 
light of the small number of women on the boards of Malaysian firms. Although research 
suggests that a certain critical mass of women on boards is needed for them to leave their mark 
on performance (Konrad et al., 2008), in Malaysia it seems that even very low level of women’s 
participation creates economic value. This finding perhaps accentuates the value of women on 
boards in this context.  
 Our findings provide economic rationale for government policies seeking to increase the 
participation of women on boards. They also support calls for the integration of the female half 
of the talent pool into leadership positions, and the belief that future growth will crucially depend 
on the full utilization of this resource, notably in emerging markets (UNDP, 2008). Our findings 
also suggest that the economic value of women’s participation could be tempered by the negative 
perception of the market, calling for adequate responses by governments and firms to enhance 
the positive view of women directors. Studies like ours could serve to influence these 
perceptions.    
 Our findings provide some important lessons for governments considering the introduction 
of gender-quota on boards. The firm-specificity of the relationships between women’s presence 
on boards and performance that we advanced theoretically and for which we find some empirical 
support opposes the introduction of a unified quota, as it entails that it could harm some firms. 
Furthermore, our theory and interpretation of the findings suggest that context may play a critical 
role in shaping the impact of women directors on performance. This suggestion, which has to be 
confirmed by a multi-country research, implies that the application of a similar quota across 
different countries could be inappropriate. Many countries, including Malaysia, model their 
gender-quota policies based on the example of Norway, and adopt quotas of similar magnitudes. 
The EU is considering the introduction of an EU-wide mandatory gender-quota requirement. Our 
study suggests that the optimal level of women on boards is likely to vary across countries, 
calling for a country-specific consideration of the desired level of women’s presence. For firms, 
our findings assigns critical role for management in selecting the level of women’s participation 
that is appropriate for their firms, as the findings suggest that this level varies across firms with 
different characteristics.   
 Besides offering general support for women’s participation on boards, however, our study 
provides no indications regarding the desired level of their presence, an issue that has important 
implications for governments that impose gender-quotas. In 2008, when the data for the study 
were collected, women occupied less than 8% of board seats in Malaysia, far below the 30% 
level that should be reserved for women according to the government recommendations. Less 
than 4% of the firms have 30% women directors, a number too small to warrant a test. The 
insignificance of the measures of women’s presence by numbers and percentages further prevent 
us from gaining insights regarding the optimal number of women on boards. We bring the study 
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Sources of data  
Descriptive statistics 
Minimum Maximum Mean Std.Dev. 
Market performance  Tobin’s q  DataStream .05 73.35 1.15 2.89 
Accounting 
performance  
ROA DataStream -1.77 .74 .017 .13 
Number of women N Firms’ annual 
reports 
0 4 .57 .75 
Proportion of 
women 
% women  Firms’ annual 
reports 
0 .50 .08 .10 
Women’s presence 1 - one woman or more; 
0 - no women directors 
Firms’ annual 
reports 
0 1.00 .43 .50 
Ownership: Family 1 – Family;  
0 - otherwise  
Firms’ annual 




1 – Government; 
0 - otherwise 
Firms’ annual 








.00 .76 .38 .18 
Board independence % independent directors  Firms’ annual 
reports 
.11 .92 .45 .12 
Board size Number of board members Firms’ annual 
reports 
2 17 7.40 1.89 
Board age Average age of board members Firms’ annual 
reports 
34.80 73.40 55.19 5.03 
Firm size Total assets, Mil. RM (natural log) DataStream 1.16 267,883 2,694 15,390 
Firm industrial 
affiliation 
Dummy variables (Appendix A)7. Bursa Malaysia 
website 
    
 
                                                 
7 There are 12 industries classified under Bursa Malaysia. Due to small numbers of companies in some sectors, we group them into the seven most represented 
industries, and classify the remaining five as ‘others’. Descriptive statistics of these variables are available from the authors. 
 
Table 2. Pearson Correlation Coefficients  
 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 
1. ROA                 
2. Tobin q# .141**                
.000                
3. Women  .081* -.064               
.019 .064               
4. Family ownership .037 -.109** .123**              
.281 .002 .000              
5. Board ethnic 
dirversity# 
.001 -.003 -.005 -.079*             
.974 .931 .882 .021             
6. Government 
ownership 
.050 .077* .056 -.141** -.119**            
.143 .026 .105 .000 .001            
7. Board independence # -.121** -.009 -.074* -.130** .026 .070*           
.000 .800 .032 .000 .443 .043           
8. Board size .201** .089* .142** .070* .042 .128** -.237**          
.000 .010 .000 .044 .223 .000 .000          
 9. Firm size .150** .116** .020 -.017 .120** .309** .008 .348**         
.000 .001 .564 .616 .001 .000 .818 .000         
10. Board age .097** .012 -.114** .068* .116** .127** .101** .083* .306**        
.005 .739 .001 .048 .001 .000 .003 .016 .000        
11. Finance -.081* .154** .037 -.107** .055 .108** .050 .049 .349** .125**       
.019 .000 .288 .002 .108 .002 .144 .159 .000 .000       
12.  Industrial products -.041 -.111** -.004 .022 .040 -.087* -.008 -.102** -.230** -.106** -.148**      
.239 .001 .907 .529 .252 .011 .816 .003 .000 .002 .000      
13.  Consumer products .073* .025 .015 .055 -.013 -.044 -.041 -.019 -.173** -.035 -.096** -.293**     
.035 .473 .659 .113 .702 .199 .229 .578 .000 .306 .005 .000     
14.  Trade & services .038 .125** -.004 -.129** -.025 .147** .032 .043 .082* -.004 -.113** -.346** -.224**    
.272 .000 .897 .000 .478 .000 .357 .212 .018 .916 .001 .000 .000    
15.  Property -.044 -.170** .080* .048 -.011 -.013 -.012 .024 .126** .008 -.078* -.239** -.154** -.182**   
.202 .000 .020 .168 .740 .713 .731 .487 .000 .808 .023 .000 .000 .000   
16. Construction -.101** .078* -.055 .072* -.046 -.048 -.025 .020 .022 -.007 -.058 -.178** -.115** -.136** -.094**  
.004 .024 .110 .037 .186 .165 .478 .567 .526 .845 .091 .000 .001 .000 .006  
17. Plantation .178** .015 -.078* .069* -.054 -.014 .035 .017 .072* .170** -.051 -.154** -.100** -.118** -.081* -.061 
.000 .662 .024 .046 .117 .695 .312 .614 .036 .000 .143 .000 .004 .001 .018 .079 
**p<.01, *p<.05 (two-tailed). N=841. 
§ Normalized using the Van de Waerden formula.  
Table 3. Model Estimates: Regression Coefficients (t-values) 





























































Women*Family    -.02 
(-.13) 




   -.00 
(-.02) 
   -.498 
(-1.776)* 
Women*Ethnic    -.39 
(-1.41) 
























































































































































































Adj. R2 .11 .12 .11 .11 .07 .08 .08 .08 
F statistic 10.60*** 10.18*** 8.14*** 6.89*** 7.10*** 6.88*** 5.91*** 5.11*** 
*p< .10; ** p<.05; *** p<.01 
Table 4. Women Directors on Boards of Malaysian Companies by Ownership Type  
N [% of all firms in a category] 
 
Presence of women Family Government Private All firms 
Numbers 
0 89 [45.9] 24 [46.2] 366 [61.5] 479 [57.0] 
1 73 [37.6] 23 [44.2] 167 [28.1] 263 [31.3] 
2 29 [14.9] 5 [9.6] 52 [8.7] 86 [10.2] 
3 2 [1.0] 0 8 [1.3] 10 [1.2] 
4 1 [0.5] 0 2 [0.3] 3 [0.4] 
Total 194 [100.0] 52 [100.0] 595 841 [100.0] 
  Mean=0.50     
% of all directors 
0 89 [45.9] 24 [46.2] 366 [61.5] 479 [57.0] 
1-9% 3 [1.5] 4 [7.7] 10 [1.7] 17 [2.0] 
10-19% 65 [33.5] 18 [34.6] 145 [24.4] 228 [27.1] 
20-29% 28 [14.4] 6 [11.5] 51 [8.6] 85 [10.1] 
30% or more 9 [4.6] 0 23 [3.9] 32 [3.8] 
Total 194 [100.0] 52 [100.0] 595 [100.0] 841 [100.0] 
  Mean=7.72%     
  Maximum=50%     
Source: Study database. 




Table 5. Robustness Tests: Regression Coefficients (t-values) 
DV: ROA Tobin’s q 











































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Adj. R2 .043 .087 .091 .118 .110 .110 .100 .058 .054 .082 .080 .070 
F statistic 3.054*** 2.192*** 3.004*** 7.229 7.71 8.72*** 6.068*** 2.233**
* 
2.149*** 5.158 5.76 5.89 
N 841 362 362 -2.842 
(-
5.948)*** 
841 841 841 362 362 -.507 
(-1.041) 
841 841 
*p< .10; ** p<.05; *** p<.01  
APPENDIX A 
Distribution of Malaysia Publically-traded Firms by Ownership Type and Industry, 2008 
 Number Percent 
Ownership type   
Family 194 23.1 
Goverment 52 6.2 
Private 595 70.7 
Total 841 100.0 
Industry   
Finance 39 4.6 
Industrial Product 262 31.2 
Consumer Product 134 15.9 
Trading and Services 176 20.9 
Property 94 11.2 
Construction 55 6.5 
Plantation 42 5.0 
Others 39 4.7 
Total 841 100.0 




Background of Women on Boards of Malaysian Firms, 2008 (N=477) 
  N %a Mean Max. Min. 
Ethnicity Malay 144 30.2    
 Chinese 300 62.9    
 Indian 11 2.3    
 Others 22 4.6    
Academic Qualifications None 201 42.1    
 Bachelor 204 42.8    
 Master/PhD 72 15.1    
Professional Qualifications Yes 143 30.0    
 No 334 70.0    
Field of Study Accounting 119 24.9    
 Finance 27 5.7    
 Business 78 16.3    
 Economics 27 5.7    
 Law 31 6.5    
 Science 12 2.5    
 Others 61 12.8    
 Not stated 122 25.6    
Age Less than 30 12 2.5    
 30-39 59 12.4    
 40-49 155 32.5    
 50-59 179 37.5    
 60-69 57 11.9    
 70 and above 15 3.2    
    50.2 88 23 
Number of years on Board Less than 5 249 52.2    
 6-10 113 23.7    
 11-15 70 14.7    
 16-20 26 5.4    
 20 and above 19 4.0    
    6.9 45 >1 
Relationships with other Board members None 268 56.2    
 Spouse 95 19.9    
 Sister 47 9.9    
 Daughter 43 9.0    
 Niece 15 3.1    
 Mother 6 1.3    
 Cousin 2 .4    
 Sister in law 1 .2    
Executive Director Yes 217 45.5    
 No 260 54.5    
Independent Director Yes 135 28.3    
 No 342 71.7    
Position CEO 23 4.8    
 Chairman 17 3.6    
 Chairman and CEO 1 .2    
 Neither 436 91.4    
Director of other companies Yes 107 22.4    
 No 370 77.6    
Source: Study database. 
aTotal may not add up due to rounding errors. 
